Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is a family of multimodal logics that has proved to be very successful for epistemic reasoning in planning tasks. In this logic, the agent's knowledge is captured by modal epistemic operators whereas the system evolution is described in terms of (some subset of) dynamic logic modalities in which actions are usually represented as semantic objects called event models. In this paper, we study a variant of DEL, that we call DEL [ASP], where actions are syntactically described by using an Answer Set Programming (ASP) representation instead of event models. This representation directly inherits high level expressive features like indirect effects, qualifications, state constraints, defaults, or recursive fluents that are common in ASP descriptions of action domains. Besides, we illustrate how this approach can be applied for obtaining conditional plans in single-agent, partially observable domains where knowledge acquisition may be represented as indirect effects of actions.
Introduction
Automated planning is the field of Artificial Intelligence concerned with the generation of strategies to achieve a goal in a given dynamic domain. A planner usually starts from a formal representation of the domain, a particular instance of the problem and the goal to achieve. The planner output is some strategy, expressed in terms of actions that cause the state transitions to reach the goal. The most common situation is that such a strategy is just a sequence of actions called a plan. In Classical Planning [1] some simplifying restrictions are assumed: the system has a finite number of states, the world is fully observable and the transition relation is deterministic and static (i.e. transitions are only caused by the execution of actions). However, a rational agent may easily face planning problems that require relaxing these assumptions. For instance, a robot may not possess all the information about the environment, either because its sensors have a limited scope, or because its actions may have non-deterministic effects that require observation for finding out the real outcome. Removing the assumptions of determinism and fully observable world naturally leads to two important questions [2] : (i) how does a plan look like in this new context? and (ii) how to represent the changes in the agent's knowledge along the plan execution?
Regarding (i), two new categories of plans have been defined in this context: conformant plans and conditional plans. A conformant plan is a sequence of actions that guarantees achieving the goal regardless unknown values of the fluents in the initial situation or the precise effect of the nondeterministic actions. If we further allow sensing actions (acquiring knowledge from the environment) then the structure of a sequential plan is not reasonable any more: a conditional plan may contain "if-then-else" constructs that allow the agent to follow different strategies depending on the knowledge she acquired when executing the plan. Approaches to both conformant and conditional planning have been broadly studied in the literature [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27] .
With respect to question (ii), several approaches studied the effects of sensing actions [4, 6, 18, 19, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31] . One prominent line of research is based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) [32, 33] , a multimodal approach where the agent's knowledge is captured by modal epistemic operators whereas the system evolution is described in terms of (some subset of) dynamic logic [34] modalities. For instance, the DEL expression [watch](K rain ∨ K ∼rain) represents that, after any possible outcome of sensing action watch, the agent knows whether rain holds or not. Different variants of DEL have been successfully applied to the problem of planning with non-deterministic, partially observable multi-agent domains [18, 19, 21, 22, 35] . Although DEL has proved to be very convenient for epistemic reason-ing in planning, it shows some important drawbacks when analysed from a Knowledge Representation (KR) viewpoint. This is because, for representing actions and their effects, DEL uses the so-called event models [36, 37] , that inherit some of the expressive limitations of the STRIPS planning language [38] . In particular, event models do not allow some important KR features, like the treatment of indirect effects, action qualifications, state constraints or recursive fluents, that are quite common in modern representation of action theories.
One popular KR formalism that naturally covers these expressive features is Answer Set Programming (ASP) [39, 40, 41] , a well-established paradigm for problem solving and non-monotonic reasoning based on the stable models semantics [42, 43] . The use of ASP for classical planning was introduced in [44, 45] , leading to a methodology adopted by different high-level action languages (see [46] and references there) and, more recently, to a temporal extension of ASP [47] . Besides, there exists a growing list of ASP applications [48] , many of them dealing with classical planning problems. When moving to conformant planning, though, the application of ASP is still under a exploratory stage. Most of the attempts in this direction relied on a extension called epistemic specifications [49] that incorporate modal constructs (called subjective literals) for representing the agent's knowledge. However, the semantic interpretation of this formalism is still under debate and only some preliminary implementations are still available -see [50] for a recent survey. On the other hand, the use of ASP to obtain conditional plans was still an unexplored territory.
In this paper, we study the case of single-agent planning and combine both approaches, DEL and (epistemic) ASP, to exploit the advantages of both formalisms in a single language. Our proposal, called DEL [ASP] , relies on replacing event models by epistemic logic programs. In that way, the basic event to describe the transition between two epistemic models becomes an ASP epistemic specification, while we keep the same dynamic logic operators for temporal reasoning among transitions. On the one hand, with respect to DEL, the new approach provides all the expressive power of ASP for action domains: indirect effects, qualifications, state constraints, defaults, or recursive fluents are directly inherited from ASP. Moreover, when a classical planning scenario (represented in ASP) becomes partially observable, the new approach allows keeping the scenario representation untouched, possibly adding new epistemic rules to describe the effects of sensing actions. On the other hand, with respect to (non-temporal) epistemic ASP, dynamic operators provide a comfortable way for explicitly representing, and formally reasoning about conformant and conditional plans.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we provide some background on the formalisms that conform our proposal. After these preliminaries, we introduce the formalism of DEL[ASP] and explain its behaviour using some examples. Then, we study the representation of conditional plans in this formalism. Finally, we discuss some related work and conclude the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we provide some background on planning in DEL, planning in ASP, and the ASP extension of epistemic specifications, since these three components will be present in DEL[ASP] up to some degree. In the case of DEL, we will present a slight generalisation of [19, 21] that admits abstract updating objects. These objects correspond to event models for standard DEL, which we denote here as DEL [E] , and will become epistemic specifications for DEL [ASP] . For the case of epistemic logic programs, we will use a recent logical formalisation [51] that avoids the problem of self-supported conclusions present in the original semantics [49] . This logic, called Founded Autoepistemic Equilibrium Logic (FAEEL) is a combination of Pearce's Equilibrium Logic [52] , a well-known logical characterisation of stable models, with Moore's Autoepistemic Logic (AEL) [53] , one of the most representative approaches among modal non-monotonic logics.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Abstract Updating Objects
Given a set of propositional symbols P and a set of updating objects O, a (dynamic epistemic) formula ϕ is defined according to the following grammar:
where p ∈ P is a proposition and o ∈ O an updating object. The modal epistemic operator K represents the (planning) agent's knowledge: formula K ϕ means that "the agent knows ϕ." The symbol "∼" stands here for classical negation (we reserve the symbol "¬" for intuitionistic negation latter on). A formula ϕ is called objective if the operator K does not occur in it. It is called subjective if it has at least some proposition and every proposition is in the scope of K. As usual, we define the following abbreviations:
, and ⊤ def = ∼⊥. We also define the dual of K as follows:K ϕ def = ∼K ∼ϕ. We keep the Boolean operators ∨, ∧, →, ⊥ and avoid defining ones in terms of the others, since this will not be valid when we use an intuitionistic reading later on. By L E (P) we denote the language containing all dynamic epistemic formulas over P.
We provide next an abstract semantics that just relies on two basic concepts: epistemic models that represent the agent's knowledge; and the updating evaluation, a pair of generic functions that describe how updating objects cause transitions among those models.
Definition 1 (Epistemic Model). Given a (possibly infinite) set of propositional symbols P and a (possibly infinite) set of possible worlds W, a model is a triple M = W, K, V where -W ⊆ W is a finite set of worlds, -K ⊆ W × W is an accessibility relation on W , and
P is a valuation function.
An epistemic model is a model where K is an equivalence relation: it is further called information cell if K is an universal relation. A belief model is a model where K = W × W ′ with W ′ = W \ {w 0 } for some w 0 ∈ W . By M we denote the set of all possible epistemic models over P and W.
We assume that the modeller coincides with the planning agent (the one whose knowledge is captured by the epistemic models). This is usually called an internal point of view, as opposed to the external one where the modeller is a different agent, an omniscient and external observer who can differentiate the actual world and knows its configuration [54, 55] . Adopting the internal orientation translates in the lack of a designated world (all worlds in the model are equally possible). A second consequence is that, even for single-agent epistemic models, we cannot replace the equivalence relation by a universal one.
Before going into further technical details, let us introduce the following scenario from [21] , which will be our running example throughout the paper. Example 1. After following carefully laid plans, a thief has almost made it to her target: the vault containing the invaluable Pink Panther diamond.
Standing outside the vault, she now deliberates on how to get her hands on the diamond. She knows the light inside the vault is off, and that the Pink Panther is on either the right or the left pedestal inside. Obviously, the diamond cannot be on both the right and left pedestal, but nonetheless the agent may be uncertain about its location. Note that the thief is perfectly capable of moving in the darkness and take whatever is on top any of the pedestals, but she is not able to know whether the diamond has been taken or not. It is assumed that there are four possible actions: move, flick, take left and take right. The action move changes the location of the thief from outside the vault (∼v) to inside the vault (v) and vice-versa. The action flick turns on the light (l). Furthermore, if the thief is in the vault (v) and the light is on (l), the thief can see (s) where the Pink Panther is. Finally, actions take left and take right respectively take the diamond (d) from the left (∼r) or right (r) pedestal if the diamond is in the intended pedestal.
The set of propositions for the example is P = {v, l, r, s, d}. For improving readability, we represent the world valuations as strings of propositions and underline those that are false. For instance, the valuation for w 1 in Figure 1a is depicted as vlrsd and corresponds to the set of true atoms {r}, making false all the rest. The initial model, M 0 represents the triple W 0 , K 0 , V 0 where we have two worlds W 0 = {w 1 , w 2 } universally connected, that is, K 0 = W 0 × W 0 = {(w 1 , w 2 ), (w 2 , w 1 ), (w 1 , w 1 ), (w 2 , w 2 )} with valuations V 0 (w 1 ) = {r} and V 0 (w 2 ) = ∅. This means that the agent knows that the thief is outside the vault (v), the light is off (l), she cannot see where the Pink Panther is (s) and she does not have the diamond (d). The two connected worlds reveal that she does not know whether the Pink Panther is on the right pedestal (world w 1 ) or on the left one (world w 2 ). The epistemic model M 1 in Figure 1b reflects the same configuration, with the only exception that now the thief is in the vault (v), as a result of moving inside. That is, M 1 = W 0 , K 0 , V 1 with V 1 satisfying V 1 (w 1 ) = {v, r} and V 0 (w 2 ) = {v}. Finally, M 2 shows the epistemic model that results from performing action flick on M 1 . In this third model, two relevant changes occur: first, l and s became true in both worlds, since flicking turns on the light, and then, the thief can see the interior of the vault. Second, more importantly, the two worlds became completely disconnected, something that reveals that the agent has now complete knowledge of the world configuration in the two possible cases, w 1 and w 2 . Formally, we have that M 2 = W 0 , K 2 , V 2 with K 2 = {(w 1 , w 1 ), (w 2 , w 2 )} and with V 2 satisfying V 2 (w 1 ) = {v, l, r, s} and V 2 (w 2 ) = {v, l, s}.
As we can see, the accessibility relation needs not be universal: for instance, we had (w 1 , w 2 ) ∈ K 2 in M 2 above. In general, when (w, w ′ ) ∈ K we say that the two worlds are indistinguishable at plan-time, given epistemic model M = W, K, V with {w 1 , w 2 } ⊆ W . In the example, model M 2 tells us that, before executing the plan, the agent cannot tell which of the two possibilities represented by worlds w 1 (diamond on the right) and w 2 (diamond on the left) will correspond to the actual world. However, once she executes the plan, she will acquire that knowledge in both cases: w 1 and w 2 are disconnected, so uncertainty in the agent's knowledge is completely removed. As a result, at that point, she will be able to make a decision whether she should perform the take right or take left action.
If, on the contrary, two worlds w, w ′ are connected (w, w ′ ) ∈ K in some epistemic model, we say that they are indistinguishable at run-time. This expresses a higher degree of uncertainty, since the agent has no way to tell which world corresponds to "reality" either before or during the plan execution. For instance, at model M 1 we have (w 1 , w 2 ) ∈ K 1 meaning that, during the plan execution, the agent will not be able to decide (at that point) whether actions take right or take left will work.
Until now, we have only described the information captured by epistemic models and presented an example with transitions among them, but did not specify how those transitions were obtained. For that purpose, we will only assume, by now, the existence of a pair of generic functions called updating evaluation defined below.
Definition 2 (Updating evaluation). Given a set of models M over set of worlds W and a set of updating objects O, an updating evaluation is a pair ⊗, R of partial functions ⊗ :
Function ⊗ takes an initial model M and some updating object o and provides a successor model
We will usually write ⊗ in infix notation and assume that it is left associative so that M ⊗ o stands for ⊗(M, o) and M⊗o 1 ⊗o 2 stands for (M⊗o 1 )⊗o 2 . Relation R(M, o) matches worlds from the initial model M and its successor model
At this point, we have all the elements for defining the satisfaction of dynamic epistemic formulas.
Definition 3 (Satisfaction). Let ⊗, R be an updating evaluation. Then, given an epistemic model M = W, K, V , satisfaction of formulas is given by the following recursive definition:
As usual, we write M |= ϕ iff M, w |= ϕ for every world w ∈ W . Furthermore, given a theory Γ, we write M |= Γ iff M |= ϕ for every formula ϕ ∈ Γ. We say that theory Γ entails formula ψ, also written Γ |= ψ, iff M |= Γ implies M |= ψ for any epistemic model M ∈ M.
It is easy to see that the semantics for the dynamic-free fragment of the language (i.e., without [·] operator) corresponds to modal logic S5 (see [56] for instance).
Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Event Model Updates: DEL[E]
Let us now see how these definitions apply to the case in which updating objects are event models [36] . The following is an adaptation of the definition from [21] . A first peculiarity of event models is that, when making an update M⊗o = M ′ , the resulting epistemic model M ′ uses world names of the form (w, e) where w is a world from the updated epistemic model M and e is a world (or event) from the event model o. For this reason, along this section, we assume that the global set of available world names W is closed under formation of pairs. In other words, W satisfies (w, w ′ ) ∈ W for all w, w ′ ∈ W. For instance, given a unique "atomic" world name w 0 ∈ W, the set W would contain infinitely many pairs (w 0 , w 0 ), ((w 0 , w 0 ), w 0 ), (w 0 , (w 0 , w 0 )), . . . and so on.
Definition 4 (Event Model
). An event model over P and W is a quadruple E = E, K, pre, post where -E ⊆ W is a finite set of worlds called events, -pre : E −→ L E (P) assigns to each event a precondition, and -post : E −→ (P −→ L E (P)) assigns to each event a postcondition, for some propositions in P.
A pair E, e with e ∈ E is called a pointed event model.
Definition 5 (Event updating evaluation).
Let M = W, K, V be an epistemic model and E = E,K, pre, post an event model, both over P and W.
′ is another epistemic model where
Given a pointed event model E, e , the event updating evaluation is a pair ⊗, R with
For simplicity, we will usually write [E, e]ϕ instead of [ E, e ]ϕ. We will also use the following shorthands
The following result shows that, indeed, the semantics described above coincides with the semantics from [21] for the case of event models.
E, e be pointed event model and ϕ ∈ L E (P) be a formula. Then,
The following result helps undertanding the semantics of (non-pointed) event models. Proposition 2. Let M be an epistemic model, w ∈ D(M) be a world in M, E be an event model and ϕ ∈ L E (P) be a formula. Then, -M, w |= E ϕ iff M, w |= pre(e) and M ⊗ E, (w, e) |= ϕ for some e ∈ D(E).
Proof. The second statement follows directly from its definitions. For the third, we have M,
does not imply M ⊗ E, (w, e) |= ∼ϕ for some e ∈ D(E) iff M, w |= pre(e) and M ⊗ E, (w, e) |= ∼ϕ for some e ∈ D(E) iff M, w |= pre(e) and M ⊗ E, (w, e) |= ϕ for some e ∈ D(E).
Going back to our running example, Figure 2 depicts the event models corresponding to the actions of Example 1. For instance, Figure 2a depicts the event model of the action take left with a single event e 1 whose precondition is v ∧ ∼d and whose postcondition {d → ∼r} states that, in the next state, d is assigned the truth value that formula ∼r had in the previous state. More interestingly, Figure 2c depicts the event model of the action flick which has two events e 1 and e 2 with the same postcondition but different preconditions. The precondition of e 1 makes it applicable when the thief is in the vault and the diamond is on the right pedestal while the precondition of e 2 is analogous but for the left pedestal. 1 In this sense, when the action flick is executed in the epistemic model M 1 (Figure 1b) , it follows that only w 1 satisfies the preconditions of e 1 and only w 2 satisfies the preconditions of e 2 . As a result, we can see that M 1 ⊗ flick has two worlds, that is, D(M 1 ⊗flick) = {(w 1 , e 1 ), (w 2 , e 2 )}. Furthermore, since events e 1 and e 2 are disconnected, we also get that worlds (w 1 , e 1 ) and (w 2 , e 2 ) are disconnected. In fact, the epistemic model M 1 ⊗ flick is isomorphic to the model M 2 depicted in Figure 1c and can be obtained just by renaming each world w i in M 2 as (w i , e i ).
Note that the existence of two disconnected events in the action flick encodes the observation that happens when the light is turned on, that is, the agent obtains the knowledge about the actual place of the diamond. For instance, if we consider the action flick ′ depicted in Figure 3a , and obtained from the action flick by connecting events e 1 and e 2 , we can see that M 1 ⊗ flick ′ is isomorphic to the epistemic model M 
Planning in Answer Set Programming
In this subsection, we informally describe the ASP methodology for representing problems of classical planning: for a more formal approach we refer to [45, 57] .
Our purpose is, by now, merely introductory, trying to illustrate the main representational features of ASP planning that are relevant for the current discussion. For this reason, we delay the introduction of a formal semantics for later on, when epistemic ASP is introduced.
ASP specifications or logic programs are sets of rules of the form:
where ← is a reversed implication, so its left hand side is called the rule head and its right hand side receives the name of rule body. The rule head a is a proposition or the symbol ⊥: when the latter happens, the rule is a constraint forbidding that the body holds. The elements in the body (b i and not c j ) are called literals, where b i and c j are propositions. The ordering among literals is irrelevant: in fact, commas just stand for conjunctions. Operator not represents default negation: we read not c j as "there is no evidence on c j " or "there is no way to prove c j ". We will also use non-deterministic rules of the form:
where m, n ≥ 0 meaning that, when Body holds, we can arbitrarily add a subset of atoms from {a 1 , . . . , a k } of cardinality c with n ≤ c ≤ m. ASP allows a second kind of negation called strong or explicit that we will represent ∼p.
From a practical point of view, we can assume that "∼p" is a new kind of atom and that models cannot make p and ∼p true simultaneously. For a simple representation of rules describing transitions we partly adopt the syntax of [57] and assume that, for each proposition p, we handle a second atom "•p" that stands for p at the immediately previous situation. In temporal ASP, actions are represented as regular propositions in P: the rest of non-action propositions in P are called fluents.
Taking all these considerations, the behaviour of action take left can be encoded in ASP as the following three rules:
where (1) describes its direct effect (grasping the diamond) whereas the other two rules describe the preconditions: (2) forbids executing take left when the thief was not in the vault and (3) forbids its execution when the diamond is in the right pedestal. Analogously, the following three rules encode the action take right:
Similarly, actions flick and move are respectively represented by the rules:
Rule (7) states the postcondition of flick, that is, the light is turned on, while rule (8) states its precondition, that is, we forbid its execution when being outside vault. Rules (9) and (10) together state the postconditions of move: its execution just flips the truth value of v.
To illustrate the use of indirect effects, we can just assert that seeing the diamond (s) just depends on being in the vault (v) with the light on (l), regardless of the actions that have been performed to reach that situation. This is naturally captured by the single ASP rule:
Default negation allows a natural representation of the inertia law, that is, a fluent normally remains unchanged, unless there is evidence on the contrary. We divide the set of fluents into inertial F I = {v, l, r, d} and non-inertial fluents F N = {s}. Inertia is then guaranteed by the pair of rules:
for each inertial fluent f ∈ F I . In our running example, the fluent (s) is considered false by default, that is, the following rule:
sating that, unless (s) is proved, we should consider that its explicit negation (∼s) is added to the set of conclusions.
If we consider now the following simplification of Example 1 where the value of all fluents in the initial situation are known, we can use ASP to obtain a plan to achieve the thief's goal.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued) . Consider now the case where the thief is outside the vault (∼v) and already knows the Pink Panther is inside the vault on the right (r) pedestal.
Listing 1 shows the full encoding representing Example 2 in the syntax of the ASP solver telingo. 2 In this syntax, ← is represented as :-, •p as 'p and ∼p as -p. By copying that encoding into a file called pink.lp and executing "telingo pink.lp" we can obtain a plan for this example.
As we said before, an important difference between ASP and event models is the treatment of indirect effects. In the example, note how s was captured by the ASP rule (11) , which only depends on other fluents (v and
r : -'r , not -r . -r : --'r , not r .
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{ t a k e _ l e f t; t a k e _ r i g t h; flick ; move }1. not refer to the original actions that caused their values. There is no flexible way to express this feature when using event models: the value of s must be expressed as a direct effect of actions flick and move, that respectively determine the values of l and v. If new actions could alter the values of those fluents, directly or indirectly, then their effect on s should also be included in their post-conditions. This is, in fact, an instance of the wellknown ramification problem [58] .
The ramification problem may also occur for epistemic effects, if we are not careful enough for their treatment. For instance, the encoding of Example 1 in [21] did not use our fluent s (where the ramification is evident), but transferred the problem to the epistemic effect of knowing the position of the diamond (r). Again, this epistemic effect must be specified as a direct consequence of some action, something that does not always seem reasonable.
In the rest of the paper, we develop an extension of DEL and ASP, that we denote DEL[ASP] where the ontic and epistemic effects of actions can be described both in a direct or indirect way, as needed. In particular, in DEL[ASP], the observation of the diamond position when the thief is in the illuminated vault can be expressed by the following rule analogous to (11) :
Here, O r is a new construct whose intuitive meaning is that "the actual value of the fluent r is observed (by the agent)." Note that we just replace the fluent s in (11), whose intuitive meaning is that the agent sees the position of the diamond, by this new construct O r, which makes this observation affect the agent's beliefs.
Epistemic Logic Programs
As explained before, we will use FAEEL for the interpretation of epistemic specifications, the epistemic extension of ASP. FAEEL inherits both the ASP capabilities for knowledge representation and the AEL capabilities for introspective reasoning. For the sake of coherence, we adapt the definitions of [51] to the use of Kripke structures. We also add strong negation [52, 59] to FAEEL, which for simplicity, is restricted to be used only in front of atoms, something that suffices for the goals of this paper and is usual in the ASP literature [43, 60] .
Autoepistemic formulas are defined according to the following grammar:
where p ∈ P is a proposition. We assume that ASP notation is transformed into its logical counterpart: not F is represented as ¬F , commas in the body are replaced by conjunctions and rules G ← F are written from left to right F → G.
Intuitively, the new construct, L ϕ, is read as "it is reasonable (for the planning agent) to believe ϕ." Weak or intuitionistic negation is defined as usual: ¬ϕ def = ϕ → ⊥. The knowledge modality is defined as true belief:
We also introduce the following abbreviations:
whose respective intuitive meanings are that the value of proposition p ∈ P is undefined and that the actual value of proposition p ∈ P is observed. Note that when an atom p is observed, the agent's beliefs have to agree with the actual value of the atom p. The use of double negation here implies that only the agent's beliefs will be modified, without providing any justification for believing p. Besides, we assume all previous abbreviations too, that is,
, and ⊤ def = ⊥ → ⊥. An autoepistemic theory Γ is a set of autoepistemic formulas as defined above. When a theory is a singleton, we will usually write just ϕ instead of {ϕ}.
A literal L is either a proposition p ∈ P or a proposition preceded by strong negation ∼p and by Lit def = P ∪ {∼p | p ∈ P} we denote the set of all literals over the signature P.
We define next an (autoepistemic) HT-model, as a combination of modal epistemic logic with the logic of here-and-there (HT) [61] , an intermediate logic with two intuitionistic worlds, h (standing for "here") and t (read as "there") satisfying h ≤ t.
Definition 6 (HT-Model). Given a set of propositional symbols P, an HT-model is a quadruple
-W is a set of worlds, -K ⊆ W × W is an accessibility relation on W , and
Lit is a valuation with x ∈ {h, t} such that V h (w) ⊆ V t (w) for all w ∈ W .
D(M) = W denotes the domain of M.
A belief HT-model is an HT-model where
t , V t we denote the total model corresponding to M. Satisfaction of autoepistemic formulas is then given by the following recursive definition:
As usual, we say that M is an HT-model of some theory Γ, in symbols M |= Γ, iff M, w |= ϕ for every world w ∈ D(M) and every formula ϕ ∈ Γ. As mentioned before, when Γ = {ϕ} is a singleton we will omit the brackets, so that M |= ϕ stands for M |= {ϕ} and holds iff M, w |= ϕ for every world w ∈ D(M).
Definition 7 (Bisimulation between HT-models). Let
be two HT-models. Given some binary relation
-for every (w 1 , w
We write M 1 M 2 iff there is a total relation Z s.t. M 1 Z M 2 . We also say that M 1 and M 2 are bisimilar, in symbols
Definition 8 (Equilibrium model).
A total belief HT-model M of some theory Γ is said to be an equilibrium model of Γ iff there is no other belief
Given some information cell M = W, K, V and some set of literals I ⊆ Lit, by M+I we denote the total belief HT-model
Lit satisfies V ′ (w) = V (w) for all w ∈ W and V ′ (w 0 ) = I.
Definition 9 (World view). Given a set of propositions P, an information cell M = W, K, V over Lit is called a world view of some theory Γ iff the following two conditions hold:
is an equilibrium model of Γ, for every world w ∈ W , -M + I is not an equilibrium model of Γ for every set of literals I ⊆ Lit satisfying I = V (w) for all w ∈ W , and -either p / ∈ V (w) or ∼p / ∈ V (w) for all p ∈ P and w ∈ W .
We say that a theory Γ is consistent iff it has some world view and by WV [Γ] we denote the set of all world views of Γ.
Example 3 (Example 1 continued). For instance, the formula
has a unique world view that is depicted in Figure 5 . Note that every propositional theory has a unique world view [51] that corresponds to the set of all answer sets of the theory. Furthermore, since ϕ 0 contains no negation, its answer sets coincide with its minimal classical models when we treat each strong negated literal ∼p as a new atom.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic with ASP Updates: DEL[ASP]
In this section, we present the major contribution of this paper, DEL[ASP], an instance of the abstract DEL framework where updating objects correspond to logic programs. Our motivation is twofold: on the one hand, to allow unrestricted use of indirect effects (both ontic and epistemic); on the other hand, to preserve the ASP representation of non-epistemic planning problems without need of any adjustment or modification. We illustrate these two objectives through our running example. 
Characterising information cells in FAEEL
Let us start by showing how any information cell can be represented by some autoepistemic formula in FAEEL. Note that world views are an information cell over Lit, so they represent a kind of three valued epistemic models where each proposition p can be true p ∈ V (w), false ∼p ∈ V (w) or undefined p, ∼p / ∈ V (w). We will show here how (two-valued) information cells over P can be simply represented as propositional formulas in FAEEL, allowing to map these three valued epistemic models into standard two valued ones.
Example 4 (Example 3 continued).
Continuing with our running example, we can see now that this model satisfies either p ∈ V (w) or ∼p ∈ V (w) for every proposition p ∈ {v, l, r, s, d} and world w ∈ {w 1 , w 2 }. Hence, we can map this model into a (two-valued) information cell by considering as true every proposition p ∈ V (w) and as false every proposition satisfying ∼p ∈ V (w). It is easy to see that the obtained information cell is precisely the model M 0 depicted in Figure 1a , that is, the epistemic model corresponding to the initial situation of Example 1. In this sense, we can use the formula ϕ 0 to represent the initial state of this example.
Definition 12. Given a set of propositions P ⊆ P, we say that an HT-model M = W, K, V h , V t over Lit is P -classical iff every world w ∈ W and proposition p ∈ P satisfy that either p ∈ V h (w) or ∼p ∈ V h (w) holds. A theory Γ is P -classical iff it is consistent and, in addition, every world view is P -classical.
Definition 13. Given a set of propositions P ⊆ P and any P -classical total HT-model M = W, K, V t , V t over Lit, by M ↓ P = W, K, V we denote the model over P where V : W −→ 2 P is a valuation satisfying V (w) = V t (w) ∩ P for every world w ∈ W .
Proposition 3. Let M be an information cell over P. Then, ϕ M has a unique world view M ′ and we have that M and M ′ ↓ P are bisimilar.
Proof. First note that, since ϕ M is a propositional formula, it has a unique world view
Note also that the stable models of ϕ M are exactly its classical models understood as sets of literals. Hence, for every w
) and vice-versa. Consequently, M and M ′ ↓ P are bisimilar.
Example 5 (Example 4 continued).
Continuing with our running example, we have ϕ M 0 = ϕ
By applying distributivity of conjunctions over disjunctions, it is easy to see that ϕ M 0 is classically (and intuitionistically) equivalent to (16) . As a result, M wv 0 is the unique world view of ϕ M 0 and, as expected from Proposition 3, it can be checked that it satisfies M wv 0 ↓ P = M 0 .
Epistemic Model Updates with FAEEL
In this section, we show how autoepistemic equilibrium logic can be used to define epistemic model updates just by using an extended signature. Given a set of propositions S ⊆ P, we define •S def = { •p | p ∈ S ∩ P } and P bi = P ∪ •P where •p intuitively means that p is true in the previous state. It will also be convenient to use • in front of any propositional formula ϕ such that •ϕ is as an abbreviation for the formula obtained by writing • in front of every proposition occurring in ϕ. Figure 6 . Note that, if we disregard all the information corresponding to the previous situation (that is all literals preceded by •) and the action move, then we have the same information as the epistemic model M 1 in Figure 1a . In other words, Γ 1 encodes the transition that occurs between the epistemic models M 0 and M 1 when executing action move.
As shown in the example above, we can represent the transition between two epistemic models as an autoepistemic theory. Let us now formalise this intuition. We begin introducing some auxiliary definitions.
Given a set of epistemic models S = {M 1 , M 2 , . . . } where each M i is a model over a set of atoms P of the form M i = W i , K i , V i and satisfying
we denote an epistemic model where
As usual, if
Definition 14. Let P be a set of atoms and Γ be some P -classical autoepistemic theory. Then, by mwv(Γ, P )
} we denote the epistemic model capturing all the world views of Γ projected into the vocabulary P . If Γ is not P -classical, we assume that mwv(Γ, P ) is not defined.
In other words, for every P -classical autoepistemic theory Γ, mwv(Γ, P ) is the two-valued epistemic model that has an information cell for every world view of Γ such that the valuation of every proposition p ∈ P in every world in mwv(Γ, P ) corresponds to the valuation of that proposition in that same world in the corresponding world view. Recall that, in a P -classical theory, all its worlds views satisfy either p or ∼p for every proposition p ∈ P . This is necessary so it is possible to map three-valued world views into two-valued epistemic models. We could remove this restriction by allowing three-valued epistemic models, but we have decided to stay as close as possible to the original DEL semantics, which is only two-valued.
Example 7 (Example 6 continued). Note that if P ⊆ P, then the epistemic model mwv(Γ, P ) always corresponds to the current situation, discarding all information about the previous one. In this sense, if we consider the program Γ 1 of Example 6 and the epistemic model M 1 of Figure 1b , we have that mwv(Γ 1 , P ) = M 1 where P = {v, d, r, l, s} is the set of fluent of Example 1.
As a further example, consider now the theory
Then, Γ 2 has two world views which correspond to the two cell informations in the epistemic model M 2 depicted in Figure 1c . This explains why we need to join together all the world views of the theory in a single epistemic model. Every world view, which becomes an information cell, represents the knowledge the agent will have after executing the action flick, while the set of all world views represent the knowledge the agent had before executing it.
Let us now define the transition between states borrowing the notion of product update from DEL.
Definition 15. Given an information cell M over P ⊆ P and a theory Γ over P bi such that Γ ∪ {•ϕ M } is P bi -classical, we define:
-the product update of M with respect to Γ as the epistemic model
Example 8 (Example 7 continued). It is now easy to see that
with Γ 3 = Γ pink ∪ {move} and Γ 4 = Γ pink ∪ {move} respectively being the theories representing the execution of the action move and flick according to program Γ pink , M wv 1 the epistemic model depicted in Figure 6 and M 1 and M 2 the epistemic models depicted in Figure 1b and Figure 1c . In other words, M 1 is the result of executing action move in epistemic model M 0 according to the description provided by Γ pink . Furthermore, for each world w ∈ {w 1 , w 2 }, we have M is also the identity.
We define now the updating evaluation for ASP epistemic specifications for epistemic models. In a nutshell, this evaluation is the result of combining the evaluation for each individual information cell in the model.
Definition 16 (ASP updating evaluation)
. Given any epistemic model M and theory Γ, the ASP updating evaluation is a pair ⊗, R satisfying
We can now directly apply Definition 3 to obtain the satisfaction of DEL [ASP] formulas, that is, DEL formulas in which the updating objects are autoepistemic theories.
Example 9 (Example 2 continued). Let us now resume the simplified version of our running example introduced in Example 2. In this case, the initial situation can be represented by an epistemic model M ′ 0 depicted in Figure 7a . Then, it can be checked that
holds with Γ 5 = Γ pink ∪ {take right}. In other words, the thief knows that after executing the sequence of actions move, take right, move she will be out of the vault with the diamond. That is, this sequence of actions is a 
Example 10 (Example 1 continued). As a further example, consider another variation of Example 1 where we have actions try take left and try take right that are similar to take left and try take left, but that can be executed even when the diamond is not in the right location, having no effect in such case. This can be represented by a theory Γ ′ pink obtained from Γ pink by replacing rules (1-6) by the following rules:
Now, we can check that
holds with Γ 6 = Γ ′ pink ∪{try take left} and Γ 7 = Γ ′ pink ∪{try take right}. Recall that M 0 ⊗ Γ 3 = M 1 is the epistemic model depicted in Figure 1a . We also can check that M 0 ⊗ Γ 3 ⊗ Γ 6 ⊗ Γ 7 ⊗ Γ 3 = M 4 is the epistemic model depicted in Figure 4b . Figure 8 depicts the epistemic models corresponding to intermediate states. With these models, we can see that (21) holds. That is, the thief knows that after executing the sequence of actions actions move, try take left, try take right, move she will be outside the vault with the diamond. Therefore, this sequence of actions constitutes a conformant plan for this problem. Note that the thief achieves her goal without ever getting to know where the diamond actually was.
Conditional Planning in DEL[ASP]
In this section, we show how to use DEL[ASP] to represent conditional plans. Let start by defining what a plan is by introducing the following plan language from [21] .
Definition 17 (Plan Language). Given disjunct sets of actions A and fluents F , a plan is an expression π built with the following grammar:
where a ∈ A and ϕ is a formula over F . We write (if K ϕ then π) as a shorthand for the plan (if K ϕ then π else skip).
As mentioned in the introduction, conditional plans contain "if-then-else" structures that allow the agent to apply different strategics depending on the knowledge she has obtained along the execution of the plan. For instance, move ; flick ; if K r then take right else take left ; move
is a conditional plan for the problem laid out in Example 1. It is a plan since, as we will prove next, the thief eventually takes the diamond out in all possible outcomes, and it is conditional because the third step contains an alternative decision. If the thief acts according to her knowledge about the diamond position at that point, the plan is guaranteed to succeed. We will show that in fact, after executing the actions move and flick, the thief knows that she will know where the diamond is. Let us now formalise these intuitive ideas by providing a translation from plans into DEL[ASP] as follows:
Definition 18 (Translation). Let A ⊆ P and F ⊆ P be a pair of disjoint sets of propositions, respectively corresponding to actions and fluents. The translation of a plan π over A applied to a formula ψ over F , with respect to a theory Γ over P bi is denoted as π Γ ψ and is recursively defined as:
where ϕ is any formula over F .
As a first remark, note that the translation a Γ of an action a is always made by adding a constant theory Γ that defines the behaviour of the action domain (fixing the transition relation). As a result, each elementary action in the plan becomes a complete autoepistemic theory Γ ∪{a} in the translation. When Γ is clear from the context, we will simply write π instead of π Γ . Conjunct [Γ ∪ {a}] ψ requires that ψ becomes true in any resulting state whereas Γ ∪ {a} ⊤ ensures that action a is executable indeed.
We check next that the evaluation of plan (22) corresponds to what we have already seen in Example 8. For the sake of clarity, we gather together all rules of the theory Γ pink in Figure 9 .
Example 11 (Example 8 continued). Going on with our running example, let us consider plans π Γ pink simply denoted as π . We have seen that M 0 ⊗ Γ 3 = M 1 where Γ 3 = Γ pink ∪ {move} was the theory representing the execution of action move according to Γ pink . We have also seen that R M 0 ,Γ 3 = {(w 1 , w 1 ), (w 2 , w 2 )} is the identity. Similarly, given theory Γ 8 = Γ pink ∪ {flick} representing the execution of action flick, we have M 1 ⊗ Γ 8 = M 2 and R M 1 ,Γ 8 = {(w 1 , w 1 ), (w 2 , w 2 )}. Figure 10 shows these three models together with the corresponding relations R M 0 ,Γ 3 and R M 1 ,Γ 8
. Looking at this figure, we observe that M 2 , w 1 |= v ∧ K r and, thus, also M 2 , w 1 |= v ∧ (K r ∨ K ∼r). From this we can conclude that Let us now continue with the thief's reasoning process after the execution of the first two actions.
Example 12 (Example 11 continued). We will show now that 
that describes the corresponding initial situation. It can be checked that (22) is also a conditional solution for Π ′ , though this example also has the simpler (conformant) solution:
move ; take right ; move
Finally, Example 10 becomes the task Π = Γ 0 , Γ ′ pink , ϕ g for which move ; try take right ; try take left ; move (27) is a conformant solution.
Conclusions and Future Work
As discussed in [62] , the traditional DEL[E] approach with event model updates is a semantic approach, where states and actions are represented as semantic objects, epistemic and event models respectively. On the other hand, DEL[ASP] is a syntactic approach, where states and actions are represented as knowledge-bases, that is, sets of formulas known to be true. Semantic and syntactic approaches are mutually dual, with the semantic approach modelling ignorance (the more ignorance, the bigger the state) and the syntactic approach modelling knowledge (the more knowledge, the bigger the knowledge-base). The generalisation of DEL for abstract updating objects can easily accommodate both approaches: it suffices with allowing both event models and epistemic programs to occur in the dynamic operator, and selecting the corresponding updating evaluation.
Another interesting observation is that both DEL[E] and ASP can be considered as generalisations of the STRIPS planning language in orthogonal directions. On the one hand, DEL[E] allows planning in domains where the world is not fully observable, the effects of actions are not necessarily deterministic and where sensing actions may allow to gain knowledge about the actual state of the world. On the other hand, ASP introduces high level KR features like the treatment of indirect effects, action qualifications, state constraints or recursive fluents (for motivation about the need of such features we refer to [63] ). The approach presented here, DEL[ASP], combines the strengths of both generalisations so that it is possible to use high level KR features in non-fully observable or non-deterministic domains where observing the world may be needed to achieve a valid plan.
Similar to our approach, the action language mAL [64] also combined the treatment of indirect effects and action qualifications with the possibility of defining sensing actions. The main handicap of mAL with respect to DEL [ASP] is that the former only allows ramifications on the ontic effects, but not on the epistemic ones, as we did for instance with rule (15) . In mAL, as in DEL [E] , this indirect observation needs to be encoded as a direct effect of all actions that may affect those fluents. On the other hand, an advantage of both DEL[E] and mAL is that they can be applied on domains that involve several agents and in which those agents may even hold false beliefs [22] , while, so far, DEL[ASP] is only able to deal with domains involving a single agent. Extending DEL[ASP] to cover these domains is a matter of future work. It will be also interesting to study the relation between DEL [ASP] and Temporal ASP [57] and the possibility of extending the latter with an epistemic modality to deal with non-fully observable or non-deterministic domains.
Regarding the computation of planning solutions in DEL[ASP], it is worth to mention that the algorithm based on planning trees described in [21] for DEL[E] is general enough and does not really depend of the kind of updating object used. In this sense, we can apply that same algorithm with the only variation of using the ASP updating evaluation when we expand the tree. Then, solutions can be retrieved from the planning tree in exactly the same way as described there.
